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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Estates-Forfeiture of Life Estate for Non-Payment of Taxes
Defendant owned a life estate in a tract of land and the plaintiff
was the remainderman. A tax sale certificate for 1937 taxes was pur-
chased by the county at the sheriff's sale in October, 1938. In October,
1940, the life tenant paid the taxes and penalties accrued thereon, but
plaintiff remainderman had previously instituted suit under C. S. 7982
to declare the life estate forfeited. No suit to foreclose the tax sale
certificate was ever instituted. The court, following a prior decision,'
'Sibley v. Townsend. 206 N. C. 648, 175 S. E. 107 (1934).
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held that failure to redeem within one year after sale of the certificate
worked a forfeiture and that the plaintiff remainderman was entitled to
the property.
2
It is generally held that only the life tenant is liable for the taxes
accruing during his occupancy 3 and that such taxes may not be en-
forced against the remainderman's interest.4 However in North Car-
olina the tax is, by statute, expressly made a lien on the entire fee.5
It is provided by C. S. 7982 that: "Every person shall be liable for
taxes assessed or charged upon the property or estate, real or personal,
of which he is tenant for life. If any tenant for life of real estate
shall suffer the same to be sold for taxes by reason of his neglect or
refusal to pay the taxes thereon, and shall fail to redeem the same within
one year after such sale, he shall thereby forfeit his life estate to the
remainderman or reversioner. The remainderman or reversioner may
redeem such lands in the same manner that is provided for the redemp-
tion of other lands. Moreover, such remainderman or reversioner shall
have the right to recover of such tenant for life all damages sustained
by reason of such neglect or refusal Dn the part of such tenant for life.
If any tenant for life of personal property suffer the same to be sold
for taxes by reason of any default of his, he shall be liable in damages to
the remainderman or reversioner." 6  Only Arkansas and Ohio have
provisions similar to this North Carolina statute.7 But the courts of
these states8 and at least one federal court9 have tended to soften the
effect of these laws. Thus, it has been held that if for any reason the
sale was invalid, i.e., if formalities of procedure were not complied with
in the tax sale, there would be no forfeiture.' 0 Where the life tenant
'Cooper et al. v. Cooper, 220 N. C. 490, 17 S. E. (2d) 655 (1941), petition
for rehearing dismissed, 221 N. C. 124, 19 S. .. (2d) 237 (1942).
' Skyles v. Kincaid, 124 Ore. 443, 264 Pac. 432 (1928) ; Smith v. Miller, 158
N. C. 98, 73 S. E. 118 (1911).
'Bolt v. Sullivan, 173 S. C. 24, 174 S. E. 491 (1934); Patterson v. Old
Dominion Trust Co., 149 Va. 597, 140 S. E. 810 (1927); Myers v. Myers, 186
Mich. 215, 152 N. W. 934 (1915); Tichenor v. Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank,
96 N. J. Eq. 560, 125 Atl. 323 (1924).
ON. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7971(134) (9).
O N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7982.7 DIGEST OF STAT. OF ARic. (Pope, 1937) §13813; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page,
1940) §5688.
s Estabrook v. Royon, 52 Ohio St. 318, 39 N. E. 808 (1895) ; Magness v. Harris.
80 Ark. 583, 98 S. W. 362 (1906) ; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark. 333,
129 S. W. 1101 (1910); Hill v. Schultz, 181 Ark. 719, 27 S. W. (2d) 512 (1930).
o Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
'
0 Estabrook v. Royon, 52 Ohio St. 318, 39 N. E. 808 (1895); Magness v.
Harris, 80 Ark. 583, 98 S. W. 362 (1906). It was urged, in the petition for re-
hearing in the instant case, that the certificate sale was invalid because the property
was insufficiently described and that, therefore, there was no forfeiture. How-
ever, the court held: (1) this was a mere afterthought; (2) the life tenant listed
the property and could not take advantage of any inadequacy in the listing; (3)
the description was sufficient and the sale valid. Cooper et al. v. Cooper, 221
N. C. 124, 19 S. E. (2d) 237 (1942).
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procured a third person to purchase for him at the tax sale it was held
that there was no-orfeiture." Where a widow, occupying the land by
virtue of dower rights, failed to pay taxes, and more than a year passed
after sale but redemption was perfected before the question of forfeiture
was raised, it was held that no forfeiture resulted.
12
It may be contended that the statute should be strictly construed
against the life tenant. However, in view of the right of redemption
given to the remainderman and the fact that the statute is penal in
nature, it would seem that the better view would be to construe strictly
in his favor. Further, even if strict construction against the life tenant
may have been proper when the statute was first enacted, subsequent
tax collection legislation'8 has so changed the situation that it is diffi-
cult to see how the forfeiture statute can apply at all in connection with
the collection laws in force since 1927.
It will be noted that C. S. 7982 provides for forfeiture of life estates
upon failure to redeem within one year after sale of the real estate.
This is entirely consistent with the collection law as it existed prior to
1927. for at that time the holder of the tax sale certificate was entitled
to a deed in fee simple if the lands were not redeemed within one year
after the certificate sale. Thus sale of the certificate could easily be
construed as a sale of the land with a redemption period reserved. In
fact, since there was only one sale-that of the certificate-for purposes
of the forfeiture statute this seems the only reasonable construction.
But in 1927 the provision entitling the certificate holder to a deed was
expressly repealed. 14 It was provided by the same law that the holder
of the tax certificate was to have the right of foreclosure by civil action,
and that this should be his only remedy.' 5 This enactment made the
certificate sale amount only to a sale of a lien on the land and not a sale of
the land itself.'8 The forfeiture statute specifically provides that forfeiture
shall occur only after sale of the land and failure of the life tenant to
redeem within one year. Under the 1927 law (as under the 1939 law)
there was no sale of the land until there was foreclosure of the tax
" Mercantile Trust Co. v. Adams, 95 Ark. 333, 129 S. W. 1101 (1910).
2 Hill v. Schultz, 181 Ark. 719, 27 S. W. (2d) 512 (1930).
Pub. Laws of N. C., 1927, Ch. 221; 1931, Ch. 428; 1939, Ch. 310, §§1719-1724.
"Pub. Laws of N. C., 1927, Ch. 221.
15 Under the 1939 law a private certificate holder is still confined to the remedy
of foreclosure. A taxing unit holding a certificate may adopt either the procedure
of foreclosure by civil action or a simpler, more informal, judgment-docketing
procedure. N. C. CODE ANIN. (Michie, 1939) §§7971(228) and 7971(229).
"e The 1927 law, unlike the 1939 law, did not expressly characterize the cer-
tificate sale as only a sale of the tax lien, as distinguished from a sale of the land,
but such was its clear effect. It referred to sale of the real estate, but also
referred to the purchaser having a "right of lien." In fact, the opinion on the
petition for rehearing in the instant case twice refers to the sale of the certificate,
made under the 1927 law, as "the sale of the tax lien." Cooper et al. v. Cooper.
221 N. C. 124, 126, 127, 19 S. E. (2d) 237, 238 (1942).
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certificate, and the sale then had was in fee simple without any redemp-
tion privilege. It would seem to follow, then, that the statute providing
for forfeiture of life estates after sale of the real estate and elapse of a
redemption period should have no application1 7 under the 1927 law,
which was in effect when the certificate sale involved in the principal
case was held, or the 1939 law, 8 which was in effect at the time of the
forfeiture. Under neither of those laws can there be a sale of the land
followed by a redemption period.
One effect of the later legislation, at least until enactment of the
1939 law, was to make more lenient the law of taxation by enlarging
the period of redemption for delinquent taxpayers, though, as pointed
out above, this redemption period precedes, rather than follows, the sale
of the land. It seems most inequitable as well as against the intention
of the legislature to say, as the court in the instant decision seems to do,
that this leniency and this enlarged redemption period should not be
for the benefit of a life tenant.
And even if this analysis of the statute is not correct' 9 there are
equities on the side of the defendant and inequities on the side of the
plaintiff which nevertheless should have entitled the defendant to pre-
vail. The defendant has paid all taxes and all penalties due on the
land, thus removing all chance of the plaintiff remainderman losing
his remainder; yet he is in substance told "Though you have done
everything necessary to protect your remainderman, nevertheless you
must forfeit your estate to him." It is submitted that the court should
have given weight to these equities. Here the plaintiff had the right
to pay the taxes and proceed against the life tenant for the same, to-
gether with the additional right to redeem the land whenever the tax
lien was sought to be foreclosed if the life tenant did not do so. Never-
theless the remainderman elected to proceed against the life tenant to
declare a forfeiture of the life estate under a statute which was passed
in 1879 under conditions differing greatly from those now obtaining.
See Leatherman v. Maytham, 66 Ohio App. 344, 33 N. E. (2d) 1022 (1940).
s The 1939 law did not change the character of the certificate sale, though it
is expressly characterized as a sale of the tax lien. And the forfeiture statute
should not apply under the 1939 law as, under neither type of foreclosure pro-
cedure authorized by it (see note 15), can there be a sale of the land followed by
a redemption period to meet the requirements of C. S. 7982. However, the instant
case seems to indicate that it, nevertheless, will apply.
" It may be conceded that if the forfeiture statute is to be applied at all under
the 1927 and 1939 laws, the court is correct in fixing the time of the forfeiture
at the end of a year following the certificate sale, at least in the absence of sub-
sequent payment by the life tenant. How poorly this will fit with the 1939 law
is illustrated by the fact that it would be possible (though not customarily done)
to complete foreclosure and sell the land in fee simple, barring all redemption
rights, within less than a year after the certificate sale. N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §7971 (228). In fact, this could very possibly have been done prior
to 1939 by proceeding under N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7990.
1942]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that he should not be permitted to invoke this harsh
remedy wherever there is reasonable factual basis for denying it. For-
feitures are not favored in law and, ordinarily, courts eagerly seize any
opportunity to defeat them.
The majority of the court, without opinion, followed Sibleyt v.
Townsend2" in deciding the case under discussion. But as the dissenting
judge says, "A vital distinction may be made between Sibley v. Town-
send ... and the case at bar because of the different factual situation.
In the case at bar the defendant, in apt time, that is to say, before any
ddte at which the lands might be stripped from her as well as the
plaintiffs, repaired her fault and paid the tax. In Sibley v. Townsend
• .. the life tenant not only did not repair the fault, but was not even
concerned in the case. It was between a creditor of the life tenant
and the remainderman. Thus, it is seen that the question before the
court in the instant case-i.e., whether payment of the taxes by the life
tenant before foreclosure of the tax certificate but more than one year
after the tax sale will amount to redemption sufficient to satisfy the
statute-did not arise and could not have been considered by the court
in that case."'2 '
If the instant decision is justifiable on any ground it must be that
the action to declare a forfeiture was instituted prior to the time that
the taxes, interest and penalties were paid by the life tenant.
It is suggested that the Legislature should repeal C. S. 7982 or that,
at least, the statute should be amended to bring it in harmony with the
present collection laws.
ROBERT BOND.
Fair Labor Standards Act-Determination of Coverage by
Character of Employee's Activity
In two recent casesl the defendants each owned a loft or factory
building in which most of the space was rented to tenants who were
engaged in interstate commerce. The landlords were not engaged in
interstate commerce themselves or in the production of goods for such
commerce. The landlords employed freight and passenger elevator
operators, watchmen, firemen, porters, engineers, carpenters, carpenters'
helpers, and others who were necessary to the proper maintenance of the
buildings. In both cases it was held that the landlord-employers were
2°206 N. C. 648, 175 S. E. 107 (1934).
2' See dissenting opinion in Cooper et al. v. Cooper, 220 N. C. 490, at page
494, 17 S. E. (2d) 655, at page 658 (1941).
'Fleming v. Arsenal Building Corp., 125 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941);
Fleming v. A. B. Kirschbaum Co., 124 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941). For a
criticism of the District Court opinion in the Arsenal case, see note (1941) 41
CoL. L. REv. 1260.
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subject to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act2 and had to pay the
building employees in accordance with its wage and hour provisions.
In reaching its conclusion the courts found: 1. The Act applied to all
employees engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods
therefor regardless of whether the employer was so engaged. 2. The
building maintenance employees were engaged in activity closely enough
connected with interstate commerce to bring them under the Act, and
3. The landlord was not a "retail or service establishment the greater
part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce" so as to
bring it under the exemption provided for such concerns.
Since the famous Darby3 case the question of the constitutionality
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, more commonly known as the Wages
and Hours Act, has been set at rest. There is now no doubt that
Congress may protect interstate commerce from the evils attendant
upon substandard labor conditions by regulation of minimum wages
and maximum hours.4 Pursuant to this power the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act provides: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees
who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce wages at the following rates. . ." (Sec. 6(a)).5 "No employer
shall ... employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce . . .for a workweek longer
than forty hours . . .unless such employee receives compensation for
his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is em-
ployed" (See. 7(a)). 6
1. Employee's work governs coverage of the Act
Under these sections it is clearly the activity of the employee which
determines the applicability of the Act. Unless the employee is en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce his
employer need not pay him in accordance with the specifications. Thus
2 29 U. S. C. A. §201, et seq.
'United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed. 609, 132
A. L. R. 1430 (1941) ; Opp Cotton Mills Inc. v. Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524, 85 L.
ed. 624 (1941).
4 Black, Wages and Hours Laws in the Courts (1939) 5 U. OF PiTT. L. REv.
223; Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtime" Now Law (1938) 37 MICH. L. REv. 28;
Maier, Federal Regulation of Manufacturing under the Interstate Commerce Power
(1940) 24 MARQ. L. REv. 175; Marshino and O'Malley, Wage and Hour Legis-
lation in the Courts (1937) 5 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 865; Murphy, The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 459; Shefelman, Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938 (1939) 14 WASH. L. REv. 66; Symposium on Wages and Hours
(Summer, 1939) 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 323-494; notes (1939) 39 COL. L.
REv. 818, (1939) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 646, (1939)
33 ILL. L. REv. 447, (1941) 6 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q. 451, (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L.Q. Rav. 454, (1938) 11 So. CAPIF. L. REv. 240, (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 92,
(1939) 25 VA. L. REv. 340.
S29 U. S. C. A. §206. -29 U. S. C. A. §207.
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it is well established that even though an employer may himself be
engaged in commerce he may have individual employees who are not
so engaged as to bring them under the Act.7 The instant cases go
farther and consider the activity of the employee to be controlling to
the extent that the activity of the employer becomes immaterial. This
conclusion, logical enough from the literal terms of the Act, is so far
reaching and significant, and involves such an extension of federal
power, that it has been avoided by most of the other courts which have
passed on the point.
Three cases involved fact situations identical with those in the in-
stant cases.8 Two cases have differed only in that office, instead of
factory or loft, buildings were involved. 9 Though an office building
is not quite so intimately connected with commerce or production as a
building actually used in the manufacturing process it is felt that this
is a distinction without a difference in that an office is certainly an
integral and essential part of any concern which is engaged in com-
merce. In all of these cases it was felt that since the landlord was not
engaged in commerce the Act should not apply to him even though his
employees might have been covered by the Act if they had been em-
ployed by the tenants themselves. In short these courts took the posi-
tion that in order for the Act to apply it was necessary for both the
employer and the employee to be engaged in interstate commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce. Where the landlord itself was
engaged in interstate commerce and occupied one third of its own build-
ing, but there was nothing to show that the other tenants were also
engaged in commerce, the court felt that the contribution of the build-
ing service employees to interstate commerce was so slight that they
should not be allowed the advantages of the Act. Though there is no
express statement the language of this opinion implies that a different
result might have been reached if it had been clear that the greater
part of the building was occupied by tenants engaged in interstate
commerce.
10
'Swift & Company v. Wilkerson, 124 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Super-
Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Fleming
v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa. 1941) ; Fleming v. Goldblatt,
39 F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill. 1941); Baggett v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 37
F, Supp. 670 (W. D. Ky. 1941); Carlton v. London Mines & Milling Co., 4
W. & H. Rep. 189 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver Co., 1941) ; see notes 24 and 25 infra.
'Merryfield v. F. M. Hoyt Shoe Corp., 41 F. Supp. 795 (D. N. H. 1941);
Killingbeck v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 259 App. Div. 691, 20 N. Y. S. (2d)
521, vzotion for leave to appeal denied, 259 App. Div. 1076, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 610,
and 284 N. Y. 818, 29 N. E. (2d) 397 (1940) ; Cecil v. Gradison, 4 W. & H. Rep.
698 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist., 1941).
'Johnson v. Filstow, 5 W. & H. Rep. 286 (U. S. D. C. S. D. Fla. 1942)
Robinson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 158 S. W. (2d) 441 (Tenn.
Supreme Ct, 1941).
"0 Brandell v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 43 F. Supp.
781, 4 W. & H. Rep. 694, 5 C. C. H. Labor Cases 0160,876 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
[ Vol. 20
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The landlord-tenant cases have all been contra to the instant deci-
sions, but in somewhat analogous situations results vary. Maintenance
and repair men hired by an employer who leased trucks to concerns
a substantial number of which were engaged in interstate commerce
were found to be covered by the Act. 1 Where the employees are hired
by an independent contractor engaged by a firm in commerce the Act
has usually been applied.1 2 The court in such cases refuses to allow
the Act to be circumvented by the use of an independent contractor,
but where watchmen were furnished to interstate firms by an inde-
pendent detective agency the Act was not extended to cover them, either
because their employer was not engaged in commerce or because he was
exempt as a "service establishment."'13 Where the employer was only
engaged in intrastate commerce the Wage and Hour Administrator has
been denied the power to investigate his records to see if any of his
employees were engaged in activity within the scope of the Act.' 4
Many cases contain statements implying that both the employer and the
employee must be engaged in commerce for the Act to apply,15 but
the instant cases have been expressly approved by at least two recent
decisions.' 6 Obviously there is much confusion in the courts.
2. Coverage of maintenance and service employees:-
But even if it should be conceded that the employer's status is of
no consequence and the employee's activity is the only factor which is
Snyder v. Casale, 5 W. & H. Rep. 222 (U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942).
"Hall v. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co., 40 F. Supp. 272, 4 W. & H. Rep.
409 (N. D. Tex. 1941), aff'd 124 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Allen v. Moe,
39 F. Supp. 5, 4 W. & H. Rep. 423 (D. Idaho 1941); Boylan v. Liden Mfging.
Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 158 (Mich. Circuit Ct., 1941); Boyd v. Dowell, Inc., 5 C.
C. H. Labor Cases 160,770 (N. M. Dist. Ct., Lea Co., 1941) ; Atkocus v. Terker, 4
W. & H. Rep. 582 (N. Y. City Mun. Ct., 1941). Compare Fleming v. Hamlet Ice
Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 518 (U. S. D. C. E. D. N. C. 1941), Nelson v. Southern Ice
Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 562 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1941), and Fleming v. Atlantic
Co., 40 F. Supp. 654 (N. D. Ga. 1941) with Chapman v. Home Ice Co., 43 F.
Supp. 424, 5 W. & H. Rep. 133 (W. D. Tenn. 1942), and Gordon v. Paducah Ice
Mfging. Co., 41 F. Supp. 980, 4 W. & H. Rep. 713 (W. D. Ky. 1941). Cf. Cor-
bett v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 43 F. Supp. 605 (S. D. Tex. 1942).
Contra, Pederson v. J. F. Fitzgerald Const. Co., 262 N. Y. App. Div. 655, 30
N. Y. S. (2d) 989 (1941).
" Fleming v. Sondock, 43 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. Tex. 1942); Farr v. Smith
Detective Agency & Night Watch Service, 38 F. Supp. 105 (N. D. Tex. 1941);
cf. Bowman v. Pace Co., 119 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); David v. Boy-
lan's Private Police, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 555 (E. D. La. 1940).
1, General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. (2d) 596, 5 W. & H.
Rep. 103 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
11 Woolfolk v. Orino, 5 W. & H. Rep. 132 (U. S. D. C. D. Ore. 1942) ; Flem-
ing v. Goldblatt, 39 F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill. 1941); Muldowney v. Seaberg
Elevator Co., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Gerdert v. Certified
Poultry & Egg Co., 38 F. Supp. 964 (S. D. Fla. 1941) ; Brown v. Carter Drilling
Co., 38 F. Supp. 489 (S. D. Tex. 1941) ; Farr v. Smith Detective Agency & Night
Watch Service, 38 F. Supp. 105 (N. D. Tex. 1941) ; Pederson v. J. F. Fitzgerald
Const. Co., 262 N. Y. App. Div. 655, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 989 (1941).
"Fleming v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa. 1941) ; Stiles v.
Emmons, 5 W. & H. Rep. 189 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas, Hamilton Co., 1942).
19421
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important in applying the Act, there still remains the problem of whether
the employees in the instant cases were "engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce." On the applicability of the
Act to maintenance and service employees the cases are in sharp, al-
most violent, conflict. Section 3(j) of the Act specifies that "for the
purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged
in the production of goods if such employee was employed in producing,
manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner
working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to
the production thereof, in any State."' 7 It has been pointed out that
the Fair Labor Standards Act, unlike some of the other statutes, does
not apply to activity which merely "affects" interstate commerce, but it
is limited to employees who are "engaged" in commerce.18 In con-
struing this section many courts feel that the Act should be limited to
those employees who have some actual physical connection with the
production of the goods, and have refused to extend the Act's advan-
tages to any others. But other tribunals have brought many more
workers under a broader coverage of the Act by taking a liberal view
of the provision as to occupations "necessary to the production" of the
goods. One case says the Act should cover any employee who in any
manner whatsoever contributes to the finished product.19
Watchmen have been a prolific source of litigation in this respect.20
2729 U. S. C. A. §203(j).
"
8Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941); Chap-
man v. Home Ice Co., 43 F. Supp. 424, 5 W. & H. Rep. 133 (W. D. Tenn. 1942);
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 43 F. Supp. 445, 4 W. & H. Rep. 628 (S. D.
Fla. 1941) ; Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg Co., 38 F. Supp. 964 (S. D. Fla.
1941) ; note (1942) 36 ILL. L. REV. 569.1 9Atkocus v. Terker, 4 W. & H. Rep. 582 (N. Y. City Mun. Ct., 1941).
The following cases, and the instant cases, have applied the Act to watch-
men: Midcontinent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 5 W. & H. Rep. 275 (U. S. C. C.
A. 10th, 1942) affirming 42 F. Supp. 908 (E. D. Okla. 1941) ; Fleming v. American
Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Steger v. Beard & Stone Elec.
Co., Inc., 4 W. & H. Rep. 411 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1941); Williams v. Gen-
eral Mills, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 849 (N. D. Ohio 1941); Fleming v. Pearson Hard-
wood Flooring Co., 39 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Tenn. 1941); Muldowney v. Seaberg
Elevator Co., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 1941); Lefevers v, General
Export Iron & Metal Co., 36 F. Supp. 838 (S. D. Tex. 1940); Reeves v. Howard
County Refining Co., 33 F. Supp. 90 (N. D. Tex. 1940); Wood v. Central Sand
& Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 40 (W. D. Tenn. 1940); Crompton v. Baker, 220 N. C.
52, 16 S. E. (2d) 471 (1941); McMillan v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 4 W. & H. Rep.
409 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Co., 1941) ; 'Hanson v. Queensboro Farm Products,
5 W. & H. Rep. 255 (N. Y. Supreme Ct., Queens Co., 1942); Doyle v. Johnson
Bros., Inc., 176 Misc. 656, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 452 (1941); Atkocus v. Terker, 4
W. & H. Rep. 582 (N. Y. City Mun. Ct., 1941) ; Spinner v. Waterways Fuel &
Dock Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 137 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist., 1942); S. H. Robinson
& Co. v. Larue, 158 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tenn. Supreme Ct., 1941); Pruett v. Car-
ruthers & Son Lumber Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 192 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1942) ; Johnson
v. Phillips-Butteroff Mfging. Co., 5 W. & 'H. Rep. 112 (Tenn. Ch. Ct., 1942);
Milan v. Texas Spring & Wheel Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 71 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.,
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It is true that a watchman does not actually work on the goods which
are produced. He does nothing in furtherance of the physical process
of manufacture, but he is certainly essential and necessary to the safe
and successful operation of .the enterprise. Many of the cases which
refuse to place watchmen within the scope of the Act could have reached
the same result on other grounds, and thus are not square holdings that
the position of watchman should not be covered.21  Likewise many of
the cases which apply the Act could have, and some have expressly, been
bottomed on the fact that the watchmen in those cases performed services
for their employers other than the mere preservation of property.22 But
even exclusive of these cases there are definite holdings both that watch-
men, as such, are23 and are not 24 within the Act. The same problem
1941) ; accord, Fleming v. Swift & Co., 41 F. Supp. 825 (N. D. IIl. 1941); Flores
v. Baetjer, 4 W. & H. Rep. 471 (U. S. D. C. D. Puerto Rico, 1941).
The following cases have refused to apply the Act to watchmen: Fleming v.
Sondock, 43 F. Supp. 339 (S. -D. Tex. 1942) ; Brown v. Carter Drilling Co., 38
F. Supp. 489 (S. D. Tex. 1941) ; Farr v. Smith Detective Agency & Night Watch
Service, 38 F. Supp. 105 (N. D. Tex. 1941) ; Rogers v. Glazer, 32 F. Supp. 990
(W. D. Mo. 1940) ; Hart v. Gregory, 220 N. C. 180, 16 S. E. (2d) 837 (1941) ;
Serio v. Dee Cigar & Candy Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 630 (Ala. Circuit Ct., 1st
Judicial Circuit, 1941); Brown v. Bailey, 177 Tenn. 185, 147 S. W. (2d) 105
(1941) ; cf. Bowman v. Pace Co., 119 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Bath v.
Specter, 5 W. & H. Rep. 357 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1942); David v. Boylans
Private Police, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 555 (E. D. La. 1940) ; Carpenter v. Waxahachie
Cotton Warehouse, 5 W. & H. Rep. 360 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App., 10th Judicial Dist.,
1942).
21 Fleming v. Sondock, 43 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. Tex. 1942) ; Brown v. Carter
Drilling Co., 38 F. Supp. 489 (S. D. Tex. 1941) ; Farr v. Smith Detective Agency
& Night Watch Service, 38 F. Supp. 105 (N. D. Tex. 1941); Rogers v. Glazer,
32 F. Supp. 990 (W. D. Mo. 1940); Brown v. Bailey, 177 Tenn. 185, 147 S. W.
(2d) 105 (1941); Serio v. Dee Cigar & Candy Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 630 (Ala.
Circuit Ct., 10th Judicial Circuit, 1941); Carpenter v. Waxahachie Cotton Ware-
house, 5 W. & H. Rep. 360 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App., 10th Judicial Dist., 1942).
" Steger v. Beard & Stone Elec. Co., Inc., 4 W. & H. Rep. 411 (U. S. D. C.
N. D. Tex. 1941); Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 275
(E. D. N. Y. 1941); Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co., 33 F. Supp. 90
(N. D. Tex. 1940) ; Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 40 (W. D.
Tenn. 1940) ; Crompton v. Baker, 220 N. C. 52, 16 S. E. (2d) 471 (1941) ; Han-
son v. Queensboro Farm Products, 5 W. & H. Rep. 255 (N. Y. Supreme Ct.,
Queens Co., 1942) ; Doyle v. Johnson Bros., Inc., 176 Misc. 656, 28 N. Y. S. (2d)
452 (1941); Spinner v. Waterways Fuel & Dock Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 137 (Ohio
Ct. App., 1st Dist., 1942) ; Milan v. Texas Spring & Wheel Co., 5 W. &. H. Rep.
71 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1941).
" Midcontinent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 5 W. & H. Rep. 275 (U. S. C. C.
A. 10th, 1942); Fleming v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa.
1941); Williams v. General Mills, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 849 (N. D. Ohio 1941);
Fleming v. Pearson -Hardwood Flooring Co., 39 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Tenn. 1941) ;
Lefevers v. General Export Iron & Metal Co., 36 F. Supp. 838 (S. D. Tex. 1940) ;
McMillan v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 4 W. & H. Rep. 409 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey
Co., 1941) ; Atkocus v. Terker, 4 W. & H. Rep. 582 (N. Y. City Mun. Ct., 1941) ;
S. H. Robinson v. Larue, 158 S. W. (2d) 432 (Tenn. Supreme Ct., 1941) ; Pruett
v. Carruthers & Son Lumber Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 192 (Tenn. Ct. App., 1942);
Johnson v. Phillips-Butteroff Mfging. Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 112 (Tenn. Ch. Ct.,
1942).
24 Hart v. Gregory, 220 N. C. 180 16 S. E. (2d) 837 (1941).
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arises as to other maintenance and service employees who are not in-
volved in the manufacturing process itself but are engaged in work
which is useful or necessary to the conduct of the business, and there
is a resultant similar lack of harmony in the judicial interpretations of
the status of such employees. 25
The freight elevator operators iiivolved in the instant cases would
seem to have a stronger claim to the protection of the Act because, al-
though they do not actually touch or handle the goods, they are engaged
in the transportation of the goods in their first step on their interstate
journey. In order for them to be shipped interstate it is absolutely
necessary that they be conveyed to the ground by elevator, and it would
be absurd to contend that this vertical transportation should be con-
sidered in a different light from horizontal. Also the freight elevator
operators carry goods up to the manufacturer to be processed. Even
if the Act did not specifically provide that an employee should be
deemed to be engaged in production if he was employed in "transport-
ing" 26 it would seem that the freight elevator operator is so closely
" The following typical cases have refused to apply the Act: Swift & Co. v.
Wilkerson, 124 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) (cashier); Woolfolk v. Orino,
5 W. & H. Rep. 132 (U. S. D. C. D. Ore. 1942) (cook for highway construction
crew); Sybert v. Bradley, 4 W. & H. Rep. 630 (U. S. D. C. S. D. Ill. 1941)
(porter-janitor) ; Drake v. Hirsh, 40 F. Supp. 290, 4 W. & H. Rep. 446 (N. D.
Ga. 1941) (bookkeeper); Labates v. Interstate Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 91 (U. S.
D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1941) (cooks in restaurant at R.R. station); Abadie v.
Cudahy Packing Co. of La., 37 F. Supp. 164 (E. D. La. 1941) (ledger clerk) ;
Carlton v. London Mines & Milling Co., 4 W. & .H. Rep. 561 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Denver Co., 1941) (weighmaster). Cf. Ikola v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 4
W. & H. Rep. 360 (Wash. Superior Ct., King Co., 1941), same case on rehearing,
4 W. & H. Rep. 470 (Wash. Superior Ct., King Co., 1941), same case reversed
on appeal, 121 P. (2d) 369, 5 W. & H. Rep. 142 (Wash. Supreme Ct., 1942)
(waiter in cookhouse of logging company).
These cases applied the Act: Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A.
1st, 1941) (repair and maintenance men) ; Snyder v. Casale, 5 W. & H. Rep. 222
(U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942) (repair and maintenance men); Womack v.
Consolidated Timber Co., 43 F. Supp. 625, 5 W. & H. Rep. 10 (D. Ore. 1941)
(employees in cookhouse of timber company) ; Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 43
F. Supp. 445, 4 W. & H. Rep. 628 (S. D. Fla. 1941) (maintenancemen) ; Fleming
v. Knox, 42 F. Supp. 948 (S. D. Ga. 1941) (bookkeepers and checkers); Fleming
v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa. 1941) (maintenancemen,
janitors) ; Fleming v. Atlantic Co., 40 F. Supp. 654 (N. D. Ga. 1941) (clerks,
repairmen); Nelson v. Southern Ice Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 562 (U. S. D. C. N. D.
Tex. 1941) (repairman); Williams v. General Mills, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 849 (N. D.
Ohio 1941) (maintenanceman); Allen v. Moe, 39 F. Supp. 5, 4 W. & H. Rep.
423 (D. Idaho 1941) (repairmen) ; Wonham v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 4 W. & H.
Rep. 218 (U. S. D. C. E. D. Pa. 1941) (porters at bus station) ; accord, Williams
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 598 (U. S. Sup. Ct., 1942)
(red caps at R. R. terminal) ; Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. (2d)
90 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) (refrigerator service man) ; Monk v. Continental Baking
Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 205 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1942) (bookkeepers); Fleming
v. Swift & Co., 41 F. Supp. 825 (N. D. Ill. 1941) (clerks, standards checkers,
timekeepers, police, firemen, comptometer operators, etc.); Reck v. Zarnocay. 4
W. & H. Rep. 305 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 1941) (equipment manager for
dance band).
Many of the cases on both sides are distinguishable.
28 See note 17 siupra.
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connected with the physical work done on the goods, and the movement
of them in commerce, that he should be considered within the Act. Cer-
tainly the freight elevator operators were as much engaged in commerce,
or in an occupation necessary to production for commerce, as red caps
and porters in railroad and bus terminals.27
3. "Service establishment" exemption as applied to landlords:-
But Section 13"(a) of the Act says, "The provisions of Sections 6
and 7 shall not apply with respect to . .. (2) any employee engaged in
any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or
servicing is in intrastate commerce." 28  It will be noted that the wage
and hour sections do not apply to "any employee" of the exempt estab-
lishment. Thus, unlike Sections 6 and 7, the status of the employer,
not the employee, governs the application of the exemption.2 9  There-
fore, if the landlords in the instant cases could establish that they were
operating a retail or service establishment the greater part of whose
business was intrastate they would not have to pay any of their em-
ployees the minimum wage or time and a half for overtime-and this
regardless of how directly any of their employees contributed to inter-
state commerce or production. Since the landlords sold no goods they
were certainly not conducting a "retail" enterprise.30 But their em-
ployees did render definite services to the tenants. The activity of the
employee should not determine the scope of the exemption, however, for
it only functions where the employer is a retail or service establishment.
"The rendering of some service is incidental to most businesses but
they are not thereby necessarily stamped as service establishments."'
2
'Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 86 L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 598 (U. S.
Sup. Ct., 1942); 'Harrison v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, Mo., 26 F. (2d)
421 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) ; Wonham v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 4 W. & H. Rep. 218
(U. S. D. C. E. D. Pa. 1941); notes (1941) 29 CALIF. L. REv. 774, (1940) 40
COL. L. Rv. 1262, (1941) 39 MIcH. L. REv. 486, (1941) 27 VA. L. R~v. 957,
(1941) 26 WAsH. U. L. Q. 279.
2829 U. S. C. A. §213 (a) (2).
: Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 40 (W. D. Tenn. 1940);
cf. Womack v. Consolidated Timber Co., 43 F. Supp. 625, 5 W. & H. Rep. 10
(D. Ore. 1941).
"0 For cases applying the "retail" exemption see: White Motor Co. v. Littleton,
124 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Baker v. Chapman Dairy Co., 5 W. & H.
Rep. 56 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Mo. 1942); Womack v. Consolidated Timber Co.,
43 F. Supp. 625, 5 W. & H. Rep. 10 (D. Ore. 1941); Duncan v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 42 F. Supp. 879 (S. D. Tex. 1941); Prescription House, Inc. v.
Anderson, 42 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. Tex. 1941); Sybert v. Bradley, 4 W. & H.
Rep. 630 (U. S. D. C. S. D. Ill. 1941) ; Jehs v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 4
W. & H. Rep. 607 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Okla. 1941) ; Klotz v. Ippolito, 40 F. Supp.
422 (S. D. Tex. 1941); Collins v. Kidd, 38 F. Supp. 634 (E. D. Tex. 1941);
Rogers v. Glazer, 32 F. Supp. 990 (W. D. Mo. 1940) ; Whitson v. Wexler, 4
W. & H. Rep. 91 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1941).
"1 Fleming v. A. B. Kirschbaum Co., 124 F. (2d) 567, 572 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941);
accord, Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941) ; Fleming v. Kenton Loose Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co., 41 F. Supp. 255,
4 W. & H. Rep. 582 (E. D. Ky. 1941); Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., Inc.,
39 F. Supp. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
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Any services extended by the landlords to the tenants would seem to
be rendered only as an inducement to obtain and keep renters. The
primary object and function of the employer-landlord was not to render
services for pay but to lease building space to satisfied tenants. There-
fore, it seems rather awkward to designate the landlord as a service
establishment. For these' reasons, feeling that the exemption should be
limited to barber shops, beauty parlors, shoe shining parlors, clothes
pressing clubs, laundries, automobile repair shops, and similar concerns,
the court in the Kirschbaum case found that the landlord was not ex-
empt as a "service establishment." The Arsenal opinion did not go
quite so far. It doubted that the landlord was a service establishment,
but pointed out that even if it were the greater part of its servicing
was not in intrastate commerce because it was rendered to tenants who
were in interstate commerce. The category of "service establishments"
is a bit vague at best, and it is certainly at least doubtful that the
employers in the instant cases fall within it.32  Therefore, in view of
the fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a remedial statute and
exemptions thereto should be strictly construed,33 it is felt that the in-
stant decisions correctly determined this issue.
Summation:-
The purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act is to eliminate sub-
standard labor conditions in interstate commerce and protect it from
interstate competition with goods which have been produced with a low
labor cost.34 Since an employer would rather hire more men than pay
-time and a half for overtime the provisions of Section 7 may have been
inserted for the purpose of decreasing unemployment by discouraging
long hours for labor.35 The instant cases point out that tenants who
pay smaller rents because the landlord pays his labor low wages can
produce goods more cheaply than similar manufacturers who have to
either hire their own building maintenance employees at the prescribed
rates or rent from a landlord who pays his labor a decent wage. Com-
" For cases applying the "service" exemption see: Corbett v. Schlumberger
Well Surveying Corp., 43 F. Supp. 605 (S. D. Tex. 1942); Fleming v. Sondock,
43 F. Supp. 339 (S. D. Tex. 1942) ; Fleming v. Peoples Packing Co., 42 F. Supp.
868 (W. D. Okla. 1942); Hayes v. General Tire Service, Inc., 4 W. & H. Rep.
459 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1941); Labates v. Interstate Co., 4 W. & H. Rep.
91 (U. S. D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1941) ;Stucker v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Ky.
1941); Hunt v. National Linen Service Corp., 157 S. W. (2d) 608, 4 W. & H.
Rep. 729 (Tenn. Supreme Ct., 1941); Ridley v. General Cab Co. of Nashville.
5 W. & H. Rep. 169 (Tenn. Ch. Ct., Davidson Co., 1942).
"Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); Fleming v. Hawk-
eye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940); Boyer v. Miller
Hatcheries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 135 (S. D. Iowa 1941).
1'29 U. S. C. A. §202(a).
"
5See Missell v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 126 F. (2d) 98, 102 (C. C. A.
4th, 1942); Williams v. General Mills. Inc., 39 F. Supp. 849, 851 (N. D. Ohio
1941).
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petition by such cheap goods is contrary to the policy of the Act.3 6 One
of the evils attendant upon substandard labor conditions is the strike
for higher wages, with its resulting loss of time and money to the
manufacturer. It is necessary to the manufacturing process that the
elevators be kept in operation, the building be kept warm and fit to
work in, and be protected from the depredations of prowlers and
thieves. Should the building employees strike, the production of the
occupants would be seriously hampered, if not entirely destroyed. This
is indicative of the vital character of these employees' work and is suffi-
cient reason in itself for finding them to be engaged in an occupation
necessary to production within the meaning of the Act. The best social
policy is achieved by extending the beneficial coverage of the Act as
far as possible, and it is felt that the spirit and purposes of the Act are
well served by the instant cases.
Though it is felt that the instant cases have taken the proper atti-
tude in allowing the coverage of the Act to depend on the work done
by the employee, to the complete disregard of the employer's activity,
this novel, and to some minds drastic, step may present many problems
in the future. For example, suppose that only a small part of the land-
lord's space had been leased to tenants who were engaged in interstate
commerce. It is settled that it is not necessary for all, or even the
greater part, of a concern's business to be interstate to warrant Federal
control of the whole enterprise. If a "substantial part" of the business
is interstate, it is sufficient,3 7 but if too small a portion of the output of
the concern is interstate, the maxim de ininimus may be invoked to
deny Federal supervision.38  Judicious application of the de minimus
doctrine would avoid unconscionable results where only a small number
of tenants, leasing little space, were engaged in enterprises an incon-
sequential part of which was interstate in character. Another problem
is presented by Section 15(a) (1), which makes it unlawful to ship in
interstate commerce "any goods in the production of which any em-
8629 U. S. C. A. §202(a) (3).
"National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 59 S. Ct. 668,
83 L. ed. 1014 (1939) ; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 303 U. S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656, 82 L. ed. 954 (1938) ; Snyder v. Casale, 5
W. & H. Rep. 222 (U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1942); Nelson v. Southern Ice Co.,
4 W. & H. Rep. 562 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex. 1941); Drake v. Hirsh, 40 F. Supp.
290, 4 W. & H. Rep. 446 (N. D. Ga. 1941); Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel
Co., 33 F. Supp. 40 (W. D. Tenn. 1940); Johnson v. Phillips-Butteroff Mfging.
Co., 5 W. & H. Rep. 112 (Tenn. Ch. Ct., 1942) ; accord, Fleming v. Knox, 42 F.
Supp. 948 (S. D. Ga. 1941). Notes (1939) 37 Micx. L. REv. 1328, (1938) ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 175, (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1221, (1939) 6 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 313
" Owens v. Gifford-Hill Pipe Co., 4 W. & -H. Rep. 697 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Tex.
1941); Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 458 (U. S. D. C. N. D. Ga.
1941) ; Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. Fla. 1941) ; Whitson v. Wexler,
4 W. & H. Rep. 91 (Tenn. Ch. Ct., 1941) ; accord, Gerdert v. Certified Poultry &
Egg Co., 38 F. Supp. 964 (S. D. Fla. 1941).
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ployee was employed in violation of Section 6 or Section 7."3 9 Under
the instant cases the employees of the landlord were employed in the
production of the tenants' goods in violation of Sections 6 and 7. Thus,
under a literal interpretation of the statute, it would seem to be unlawful
for the tenants to ship their manufactured products, although they were
not responsible for the payment of the building employees and had
nothing to do with the violation of the Act. But it has been held that
the employees cannot recover unpaid wages from anyone except their
employef regardless of their having rendered their services for another
who was engaged in commerce. 40 Note too the difference in wording
between Sections 6 and 7 and Section 15(a). The first two sections
apply to employees who have been "engaged" in commerce, etc., whereas
Section 15 (a) speaks of employees who have been "employed" in
violation of the Act. By holding that the penalties of Section 15(a) (1)
should only apply to shippers who have themselves employed employees
in violation of the Act the inequitable result of tying up the tenants'
goods because of the landlord's derelictions could be avoided.
Certiorari has been granted in both the instant cases and an authori-
tative ruling on many of the conflicting points should soon be handed
down by the United States Supreme Court.
JOHN T. KIL'ATRICK, JR.
Freedom of Speech in Labor Disputes-Secondary Boycott-
Anti-Picketing Injunction Under State Anti-Trust Act
R., cafe owner, entered into a contract with P., a contractor, for
the construction of a building. The building was in no way connected
with the business of the cafe, and was one and one-half miles distant
therefrom. P., having absolute discretion as to the employment of
labor, employed non-union labor. All of the employees of R's. cafe were
union members, and there was no dispute between their employer and
them. Neither was there any dispute between R. and the Carpenters
and Joiners Union. But because P. employed non-union labor the Car-
penters Union caused R's. cafe to be picketed. The signs borne by the
pickets read: "This Place Unfair to Carpenters and Joiners Union of
America Local no. 213 and Painters Local no. 130, Affiliated With
American Federation of Labor". These signs were later amended to
read: "The Owner of This Cafe Has Awarded a Contract to Erect a
Building to AV. A. Plaster Who is Unfair to The Carpenters Union 213
" 29 U. S. C. A. §215(a) (1).
"
0Whatley v. Great Southern Trucking Co., 4 W. & H. Rep. 625 (U. S. C. C.
A. 5th, 1941); Bowman v. Pace Co., 119 F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Mad-
dox v. Jones, 42 F. Supp. 35 (N. D. Ala. 1941) ; David v. Boylan's Private Police,
Inc., 34 F. Supp. 555 (E. D. La. 1940). But cf. Cotterell v. Wetterau Grocer Co.,
4 W. & H. Rep. 482 (U. S. D. C. E. D. Mo. 1941).
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and Painters Union 130 Affiliated With American Federation of
Labor". Contemporaneous with the picketing the restaurant worker's
union called R's. employees out on strike. Truck drivers, delivering
supplies, and other union workers refused to cross the picket lines, and
as a result R's. business was decreased by sixty percent. It was con-
ceded that there was neither fraud nor violence in the picketing. R.
brought action under the Texas anti-trust statute for an injunction
against the picketing. The Texas court granted an injunction which re-
strained the Union from picketing the restaurant, but did not restrain
them from picketing at the construction job or elsewhere. The action of
the Texas court was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States
on the ground that the Texas statute, as applied here, constituted a valid
regulation rather than an unconstitutional denial of the freedom of
speech.1
In a line of cases, starting with Senn v. Tile Layers Protective
Union,2 the United States Supreme Court said that peaceful picketing
was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Fed-
eral Constitution. It was said in the Senn case: "Members of a union
might, without special statutory authorization by. a State, make known
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. '
This idea was followed and expanded in the cases of Thornhill v.
Alabama4 and Carlson v. California,5 where it was held that picketing
per se presented no such "clear and present" danger as to justify a
statute prohibiting all picketing, peaceful or otherwise. These two de-
cisions were hailed as extremely important advances for labor. It was
said that they shifted the burden from the Unions, which formerly
had to prove the legality of their actions, to the state, which must now
prove that anti-picketing legislation does not infringe labor's constitu-
tional rights.6
In the case of A. F. of L. v. Swing 7 the area of picketing to which
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech was applicable was
expanded still further by a decision that the constitutional provision
was applicable even in the absence of an employer-employee relationship.
This step forward in the interest of labor'caused speculation as to the
'Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 10
U. S. LAW WEEK, 4293 (1942).
' Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 81 L. ed. 1229, 57 S. Ct.
857 (1937).
'Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478, 81 L. ed. 1229, 1236,
57 S. Ct. 857, 862 (1937).
'Thornbill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 84 L. ed. 1093, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 84 L. ed. 1104, 60 S. Ct. 879 (1940).
Note (1940) 9 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 185.
'A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 85 L. ed. 855, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
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extent that the court would go in protecting picketing under the Con-
stitution. It was said: "Picketing, having been withdrawn from the area
of state control in primary boycotts, and the permissible area of indus-
trial conflict having been broadened by the elimination of the necessity
for an employer-employee relationship, a slight further widening of the
circle of 'economic competition' would place the secondary boycott
within the realm of Constitutional right. Whether the court will take
this step remains an open question. .".. The question is no longer
open. The court in the instant case clearly ruled that the First Amend-
ment does not apply to secondary boycotts.
The test best adapted to the determination of whether a particular
activity is covered by the guaranty of freedom of speech is the "clear
and present" danger test.9 This was the test applied in the Carlson
case where it was decided that peaceful picketing presented no such
clear and present danger as to justify a suppression of picketing.
It has been ruled in at least one case that a secondary boycott pre-
sents a danger to society. In Iron Moulders Union v. Allis Chalniers
Co. ° the court said: "In contests between capital and labor the only
means of injuring each other that are lawful are those that operate
directly and immediately upon the control and supply of work to be
done and of labor to do it, and thus directly affect the apportionment
of the common fund, for only at this point exists the competition, the
evils of which organized society will endure rather than suppress the
freedom and the initiative of the individual. But attempts to injure
each other by coercing members of society who are not directly con-
cerned in the pending controversy to make raids in the rear cannot be
tolerated by organized society for the direct and primary attack is upon
society itself.""-
The majority of the courts which have enjoined peaceful picketing
in such situations have taken a different approach to the problem. The
emphasis has been put upon the unlawful aspect of the secondary boy-
cott rather than upon any "clear and imminent danger" to the state.
They have proceeded on the theory that it is unlawful in an effort to
compel A. to yield a legitimate benefit to B., for B. to demand that C.
withdraw his patronage from A. under penalty of losing B's. services
or patronage and the services or patronage of those whom B. could
8 Note (1941) 41 COL. L. Rzv. 1444.
'Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 71 L. ed. 1095, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927):
Schenk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 63 L. ed. 470, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919) ; ef. Gitlow v.
People of New York. 268 U. S. 652, 69 L. ed. 1138, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925), where it
was held that a legislative determination that certain words constitute a "clear and
present danger" is conclusive on the courts.
"0 Iron Molders Union v. Allis Chalmers Co.. 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th. 1908).
" Iron Molders Union v. Allis Chalmers Co.. 166 Fed. 45. 51 (C. C. A. 7th,
1908).
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peacefully and truthfully persuade to cease dealings with C. In other
words, the courts, in so holding, have decided that C's. right to pursue
his relations with A. are superior to B's. right of free speech in this
situation. Under this interdiction have fallen cases involving the pick-
eting of a boarding house where non-union workmen resided,12 the
picketing of premises of one using signs painted by an employer with
whom the pickets had a dispute,13 the picketing of a customer of a
window cleaner with whom the pickets had a dispute,14 the picketing
of customers of a burglar alarm system installed by one of the disputants
in a labor controversy,' 5 and the picketing.of advertisers in a newspaper
because of a dispute with the latter.'6
This position has not gone unchallenged, 17 and some courts, feeling
the inconsistency between a holding which elevates property rights above
the rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press and the
numerous judicial statements and holdings as to the sanctity of these
two latter rights, have relaxed the rule somewhat. Where such courts
have found a "unity of interest"' 8 to exist between the employer with
whom the pickets had a labor dispute and the party picketed, a secondary
boycott was held not to be illegal. This situation arises where there is
a dispute between an employer making and/or handling a product and
his employees or members of a union, and the employees or members
of the union picket the customers of the employer. " The theory em-
ployed in these holdings is that the picketers are only following the
12 F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, 77 Vt. 294, 60 Atl. 74 (1905).
13 People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939) ; American Gas
Station v. "Doe," 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019 (2d Dep't, 1937).
'" Allied W. & H. Cleaning Co. v. Palmerie, 229 App. Div. 854, 243 N. Y. Supp.
848 (lst Dep't, 1930).
Katzman & Co. v. Kirkman, 18 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 903 (1940); Contra:
People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941).1 B. Gertz, Inc. v. Randau, 162 Misc. 786, 295 N. Y. Supp. 87i (Sup. Ct. 1937).
1 Quinn v. Leathem, 17 T. L. R. 749 (Eng. 1901) note (1920) 6 A. L. R. 936,
usually cited for the proposition that secondary boycotts are illegal, inferentially
held that a secondary boycott was not per se illegal. In that case the issue of
violence in the picketing was submitted to the jury, which found that violence
existed. On this basis damages were awarded to the one picketed. In Pierce v.
Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, 327 (1909) it was said: "They may
go even further than this [striking and engaging in a primary boycott], and request
of another that he withdraw his patronage from the employer, and may use the
moral intimidation and coercion of threatening a like boycott against him if he
refuses to do so." This statement was approved in Truax v. Bisbee, 19 Ariz. 379,
171 Pac. 121 (1918) ; cf. Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont.
264, 96 Pac. 127 (1908). In the American Law Institute, RESTATEtENT OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, §801, the rule is laid down that employees are not liable to their
employer or a third person if, in order to induce the third person to refrain from
patronizing the employer, they induce others, by fair persuasion and for a proper
object, to refrain (a) from buying from the third person goods or services which
have been furnished to him by the employer, or (b) from selling to the third
person goods or services which will be furnished by him to the employer.
18 Goldfinger v. Feintuch. 276 N. Y. 281. 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937): N. Y.
Lumber Trade Association v. Lacy. 269 N.Y. 595. 199 N. E. 688 (1935) : Willson
and Adams Co. v. Pearce. 264 N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934).
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product to the point where the picketing will be most effective; thus,
general picketing of the retailer is forbidden by these courts, and the
picketing is confined to the product of the employer with whom the
dispute exists. 9 A few courts, more bold than the rest, have even gone
beyond the requirement of a "unity of interest". The New York
court, in a recent decision,20 held that the picketing of a user of a
burglar alarm system because of a dispute between the picketers and the
maker of the alarm was a valid exercise of free speech. The California
court, in a case not involving secondary boycott, has held that it is legal
for members of a union to picket a non-union employer who persisted
in keeping his establishment open on Sunday in competition with union
employers who closed on that day.2 1
The severity (at least from labor's point of view) of the instant
decision was somewhat mitigated by the case of Bakery Drivers Union
v. Wohl,22 decided at the same term of court. There it was held to be
an invasion of Constitutional rights for New York to restrain peaceful
picketing of a bakery which sold to peddlers with whom the union had
a dispute. However, in the Wohl case the wording of the banner and
the facts were such that it could be considered one of the "unity of
interest" cases. At any rate, the Wohl decision would seem to limit
the effect of the instant case to the ruling that to picket a business
generally where there is no unity of interest, as that phrase is generally
used by the courts, is an illegal exercise of freedom of speech which
may be restrained by the state under an anti-trust statute.
The holding in the Texas case follows the majority view, but seems
to be indicative of an attitude toward labor, which, if persisted in, might
lead to further restrictions not so desirable in ordinary times. It is to
be hoped, for this reason, that the holding is the result of the effect upon
the courts of the circumstances of our times, rather than the end of a
pro-labor trend. FRED R. EDNEY, JR.
Removal of Causes-Proceedings in Federal and State Courts
Subsequent to State Court's Denial of Motion to Remove
In certain types of cases the federal and state courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction-the suit may be brought in either court.1 The
" Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); Engle-
meyer v. Simon, 148 Mich. 621, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636 (S. Ct. 1933) ; Commercial
H. & W. Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 138 Misc. 512, 240 N. Y. Supp. 797 (S. Ct.
1930); Spanier Window Cleaning Co. v. Awerkin, 225 App. Div. 735, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 886 (1st Dep't, 1928).
"People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941).
" Ex Parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938).
" 10 U. S. LAW WEEK 4287 (1942).
See HUGHES, FEDEAL PRACTICE (1931) c. 5, Jurisdiction of District Courts
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plaintiff may choose the tribunal in which he wishes to institute the
action, but in order to allow the defendant some choice of the court in
which he is to be tried federal statutes2 since the inception of the na-
tional judicial system have provided for the transfer or "removal" of
the cause from the state court to the federal court at the instance of the
defendant.3
In removal of suits against revenue officers or aliens, or where re-
moval is sought because of local prejudice, the defendant must petition the
Federal District Court, but in all other cases the removal petition must
first be addressed to the state court.4 There the state court determines
whether the face of the record justifies removal, but if the plaintiff
wishes to -defeat removal by controverting any of the facts alleged he
must do so in the federal court on a motion to remand.5
If a petition for removal, properly filed and alleging the necessary
jurisdictional facts, is presented to the state court the removal takes
place eo instante; the state court loses, and the federal court acquires,
jurisdiction automatically by operation of law. 6 The state court is then
without power to do anything except enter a formal order of removal
and send a ttanscript of the record to the federal court. Any other pro-
ceedings in the state court subsequent to the filing of the petition are
Concurrent with State Courts, §291 et seq.; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
228 U. S. C. A. §§71-83; HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §§2271-2275. No
suit may be removed except as provided by statute, and there may be no removal
from the federal to the state courts. This paper is not concerned with the actual
merits of whether or not any suit should be removed.
'At one time the statute allowed either the plaintiff or the defendant to obtain
removal. 18 STAT. 470, 471 (1875) ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed.
354 (1880). Now only a defendant may remove a case under 28 U. S. C. A. §71.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3491. In the rare cases involving state land
grants, either party may still remove if he claims the land by grant from a state
other than that in which the action is pending. 28 U. S. C. A. §73; Shepherd's
Heirs v. Young, 17 Ky. 203 (1824).
28 U. S. C. A. §§72, 76, 77.
'Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 25 S. Ct.
251, 49 L. ed. 462 (1905) ; Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513,
7 S. Ct. 1262, 30 L. ed. 1159 (1887) ; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279, 6 S. Ct. 1050,
30 L. ed. 167 (1886) ; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 6 S. Ct. 799, 29
L. ed. 962 (1886); Tate v. Southern R. R. Co., 205 N. C. 51, 169 S. E. 816
(1933) ; Morganton v. Hutton, 187 N. C. 736, 122 S. E. 842 (1924) ; Rea v.
Standard Mirror Co., 158 N. C. 24, 73 S. E. 116 (1911); Higson v. North River
Ins. Co., 153 N. C. 35, 68 S. E. 920 (1910), same case in federal court, 184 Fed.
165 (C. C. E. D. N. C., 1911) ; Springs v. Southern R. R. Co., 130 N. C. 186, 41
S. E. 100 (1902); Lawson v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 112 N. C. 390, 17
S. E. 169 (1893) ; see Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416, 419, 420, 81
S. E. 624, 626 (1914).
'Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 25 S. Ct.
251, 49 L. ed. 462 (1905) ; Huntley v. Southeastern Express Co., 191 N. C. 696,
132 S. E. 786 (1926) ; Smith v. Quarries Co., 164 N. C. 338, 80 S. E. 388 (1913) ;
Harrison v. Allen, 152 N. C. 720, 68 S. E. 207 (1910) ; Tucker v. Interstate Life
Assoc., 112 N. C. 796, 17 S. E. 532 (1893) ; Winslow v. Collins, 110 N. C. 119, 14
S. E. 512 (1892) ; HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §§2551, 2553.
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void if the petition is eventually found to have been a proper one.7 The
federal court takes the case as if it had been originally instituted therein
and all pleadings and procedure taken in the state court prior to the
filing of the removal petition are to be given their proer effect in the
federal court.8
But no action of the state court can force the federal court to enter-
tain a suit which it considers to be beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
Whenever its lack of furisdiction becomes apparent the federal court
may, on its own motion, remand the cause to the state court from
whence it came.9 The plaintiff has a right to move for remand and,
since federal jurisdiction may not be created by consent, he may not
waive the right to move for remand for lack of jurisdiction though he
might waive (or be estopped to assert) his right to a remand order for
defective procedure in removing the case.' 0 An order denying a motion
to remand is not a final judgment from which there may be an immediate
appeal to a higher federal court, but it may be reviewed on appeal after
the final judgment is rendered following the trial in the lower court."
On the other hand, pursuant to the general policy of curtailing federal
litigation wherever possible, an order of remand entered by the Federal
District Court is not reviewable at all.' 2 The order of remand may not
" See note 6 supra. Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, 22 L. ed. 68(1873); Rea v. Standard Mirror Co., 158 N. C. 24, 73 S. E. 116 (1911); see
Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416, 420, 81 S. E. 624, 626 (1914);
HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §2554. But cf. Smith v. Greenlee, 14 N. C.
387 (1832).
828 U. S. C. A. §§72, 78, 79, 81; HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §2642.
Though ordinarily there may be no removal unless the Federal District Court
would have -had original jurisdiction of the cause, this prohibition does not apply
where the suit could not have been originally instituted in the federal court be-
cause of mere procedural or venue restrictions. HUGHES, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
(1931) §§2298, 2299. Since the jurisdiction of the federal court must rest on that
of the state court from which the removal is made, no suit may be removed unless
it was properly within the state court's jurisdiction. HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(1931) §2301.
"28 U. S. C. A. §§71, 80; Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S. 199, 61 S. Ct. 213,
85 L. ed. 124 (1940) (state court's decision on removability not res judicata in fed-
eral court) ; Employers' Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 57 S. Ct.
273, 81 L. ed. 124 (1937) ; General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 260
U. S. 261, 43 S. Ct. 106, 67 L. ed. 244 (1922) (state court's decision as to suffi-
ciency of service not conclusive on federal court upon removal) ; HUGHES, FEDERAL
PRACTICE (1931) §§2651-2689, 5903; Notes (1941) 25 MINN. L. Riw. 531, (1937)
14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 411, (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 549, (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 158.
10 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §§2658, 2659.
HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTIcE (1931) §§2685, 2686, 5903; Note (1937) 14 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 411.
"' "Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any district
court of the United States, and the district court shall decide that the cause was
improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the State court from
whence it came, such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no
appeal or writ of error from the decision of the district court so remanding such
cause shall be allowed." 28 U. S. C. A. §71; 'MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938)
3516-3520.
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be reviewed -directly by appeal to a higher federal court,' 3 by appeal or
certiorari through the highest state court to the United States Supreme
Court, 14 by mandamus to compel the District judge to take jurisdic-
tion,15 or in any other manner either direct or indirect.16 In short the
District Court's order of remand is final and conclusive upon all courts.
If the federal court decides not to assume jurisdiction its decision is
controlling, but a contrary conclusion would not be so influential. The
state court is not bound to accept the decision of the lower federal court.
If the face of the record, assuming the verity of all facts alleged, does
not, in the opinion of the state court, justify removal the state court is
free to deny removal and continue with a trial on the merits.17 Indeed
the North Carolina court has even defied an order of removal granted
by the lower federal court on grounds of local prejudice where the
petition was first presented to the federal court.' 8 Where the federal
court has erroneously taken cognizance of the cause the state court can-
not be forced to relinquish its jurisdiction. But if the defendant is
actually entitled to a removal no action of the state tribunal may destroy
his federal right. 19 If he believes that the state determination that the
Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56, 8 S. Ct. 65, 31 L. ed. 68 (1887).
Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127, 37 S. Ct. 567, 61 L. ed. 1036 (1917);
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U. S. 556, 16 S. Ct. 389, 40 L. ed. 536(1896).
"' Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U. S. 195, 61 S. Ct. 213 85 L. ed. 124 (1940);
Employers' Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U. S. 374, 57 s. Ct. 273, 81 L. ed.
289 (1937); In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U. S. 451, 11 S. Ct. 141, 34 L. ed. 738
(1890); Moulding-Brownell Corp. v. Sullivan, 92 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 7th,1937).19 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §2684; for a comprehensive survey and
many collected cases see Note (1938) 114 A. L. R. 1476. The United States
Supreme Court may review an order of the Circuit Court of Appeals remanding
the cause to the state court, notwithstanding that there can be no review of a
remand order of the District Court. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U. S. 25, 54 S. Ct. 608, 78
L. ed. 1099, 92 A. L. R. 970 (1934). Before 1875 a remand order of the lower
federal court could be reviewed by mandamus but not by appeal because it was
not a final judgment. Between 1875 and 1877 the order could be reviewed by
writ of error or appeal. See Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U. S. 56, 57, 8 S. Ct. 65, 31
L. ed. 68, 69 (1887).
1T Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 25 S. Ct.
251, 49 L. ed. 462 (1905) ; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279, 6 S. Ct. 1050, 30 L. ed.
167 (1886) ; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 6 S. Ct. 799, 29 L. ed. 962
(1886); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. 183, 24 L. ed. 427 (1877);
Morganton v. Hutton, 187 N. C. 736, 122 S. E. 842 (1924) ; Higson v. North River
Ins. Co., 153 N. C. 35, 68 S. E. 920 (1910), same case in federal court, 184 Fed.
165 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1911); Springs v. Southern R. R. Co., 130 N. C. 186, 41
S. E. 100 (1902); Lawson v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 112 N. C. 390, 17
S. E. 169 (1893) ; Tucker v. Interstate Life Assoc., 112 N. C. 796, 17 S. E. 532(1893) ; see Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416, 420, 81 S. E. 624, 626
(1914).
" Lawson v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 112 N. C. 391, 17 S. E. 169
(1893). But see Higson v. North River Ins. Co., 153 N. C. 35, 39, 68 S. E. 920,
922 (1910), same case in federal court, 184 Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1911).
"o North Carolina Public Service Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed. 837, 33
A. L. R. 626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922), cert. granted, 260 U. S. 716, 43 S. Ct. 94, 67
L. ed. 478 (1922), cert. dismissed as improperly granted, 263 U. S. 508, 44 S. Ct.
1942]
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case is not removable is erroneous, and he still wishes to insist on his
right to a federal trial, three possible procedures are open to him. 20
FiRST :-He may save an exception to the state court's ruling and
continue to contest the case in that court. In such a case his remaining
in state court is not a waiver of his right to remove; and if the decision
is adverse the defendant may seek a reversal of the denial of removal
in the state appellate court, and, in a proper case, he may have the denial
of removal reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.2 ' Should
they find that removal was improperly denied the cause will be re-
manded back through the successive appellate courts to the state court
which denied the petition to remove, with directions to that court to
enter an order of removal. 22 The defendant will then get his trial in
the federal court. Such a procedure amply safeguards the right of the
defendant to have a federal trial eventually, but it may be years before
he can get a reversal of the denial of removal by some appellate court.
All the disadvantages of delay accrue. It is certainly detrimental to the
public interest to encumber the courts with prolonged litigation; and
by the time the federal trial is obtained the defendant's witnesses may
have died or departed, or evidence may have been lost. Of course it is
possible that in a particular case the delay may work to the defendant's
advantage, but in any case he will be burdened with the expense of
having two trials.
SECOND:-Should the defendant decide that he wants an immediate
federal trial he may, after denial of his removal petition, abandon the
case in state court and invoke federal jurisdiction by filing in the Fed-
eral District Court a certified copy of the record. If the federal court
determines that the case really should be removed it may take cognizance
of the suit and proceed to trial. Thus the defendant may remove the
164, 68 L. ed. 413 (1924), see same case in state court, 181 N. C. 356, 107 S. E.
226 (1921) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 29 S. Ct. 430, 53
L. ed. 765 (1908) ; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S.
239, 25 S. Ct. 251, 49 L. ed. 462 (1905); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall.
214, 22 L. ed. 68 (1873) ; accord, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed. 667
(1879). But cf. Iowa Central R. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305, 35 S. Ct. 357, 59
L. ed. 591 (1914).
20 For a good summary see Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S.
563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85 L. ed. 1044 (1941) and cases cited.
21 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 567, 61 S. Ct. 715,
717, 85 L. ed. 1044 (1941) ; Iowa Central R. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305, 35 S.
Ct. 357, 59 L. ed. 591 (1914) ; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 6 S. Ct. 799,
29 L. ed. 962 (1886) ; Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed.
243 (1881) ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed. 354 (1880) ; Removal
Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. ed. 593 (1879) ; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S.
183, 24 L. ed. 427 (1877) ; Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97, 10 L. ed. 900 (1842) ;
Huntley v. Southeastern Express Co., 191 N. C. 696, 132 S. E. 786 (1926) ; Harri-
son v. Allen, 152 N. C. 720, 68 S. E. 207 (1910); Winslow v. Collins, 110 N. C.
119, 14 S. E. 512 (1892).
2" Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L. ed. 243 (1881) ; Gor-
don v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97, 10 L. ed. 427 (1842).
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case to the federal court despite the ruling of the state court,2 3 and if the
plaintiff does not come into federal court his suit may be dismissed there
for want of prosecution. 24 But the District Court's assumption of juris-
diction is reviewable on appeal2 5 and the case may be remanded at any
time lack of jurisdiction appears.2 6 The effect of remand is to declare
that the federal court never had jurisdiction and that therefore the state
court never lost jurisdiction. The case is treated as if it had never been
removed.2 7 Since theoretically the state court never relinquished juris-
diction it follows that any action the state court may have taken in the
interim before the remand would be valid.2 8 For this reason the de-
fendant risks losing his entire case by attempting a removal and at the
same time abandoning the suit in- state court. Except in removals of
suits against revenue officers or aliens, or for local prejudice or denial
of civil rights the removal must take place, if at all, before the expiration
of the time for filing the answer in the state court.2 9 The proceedings
"Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 567, 61 S. Ct. 715,
717, 85 L. ed. 1044 (1941) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207,
29 S. Ct. 430, 53 L. ed. 765 (1908); Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed.
354 (1880); Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. ed. 593 (1879); Home Life Ins.
Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, 22 L. ed. 68 (1873); North Carolina Public Service
Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed. 837, 33 A. L. R. 626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922),
cert. granted, 260 U. S. 716, 43 S. Ct. 94, 67 L. ed. 498 (1922), cert. dismissed as
improperly granted, 263 U. S. 508, 44 S. Ct. 164, 68 L. ed. 413 (1924), same case
in state court, 181 N. C. 356, 107 S. E. 226 (1921) ; see Pruitt v. Charlotte Power
Co., 165 N. C. 416, 420, 81 S. E. 624, 626 (1914) ; see note 19 supra.0 Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305, 35 S. Ct. 357, 59 L. ed. 591
(1914).2 The only proper method of review in such cases is by appeal to a higher
federal court. It is not proper for the plaintiff to continue in state court and ignore
the proceedings in federal court on the theory that they will be a nullity if that court
erroneously assumed jurisdiction. Such a collateral attack will not be entertained
by the United States Supreme Court when the case comes there from the highest
state court, and it will refuse to review the District Court's decision. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 29 S. Ct. 430, 53 L. ed. 765 (1908) ; Kern
v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed. 354 (1880). And the United States Su-
preme Court would review and reverse any state decision permitting a collateral
attack on the unreversed decision of the federal court that it had jurisdiction.
-o See notes 9, 10, & 11 supra.
o Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85
L. ed. 1044 (1941); Queens Ins. Co. v. Peters, 10 Ga. App. 289, 73 S. E. 536
(1912) ; Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Francis, 52 Miss. 457, 24 Am. Rep. 674 (1876).
28 Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85
L. ed. 1044 (1941) ; Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127, 37 S. Ct. 567, 61 L. ed.
1036 (1917) ; Western Indemnity Co. v. Kendall, 27 Ariz. 342, 233 Pac. 583
(1925); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Indian-Tex Petroleum Co., 203 Ky. 521, 263
S. W. 1 (1924) ; accord, Iowa Central Ry. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U. S. 305, 35 S. Ct.
357, 59 L. ed. 591 (1914). Contra: Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55
S. W. 562 (1900).
2D28 U. S. C. A. §§72, 74, 76, 77; Butler v. Armour & Co., 192 N. C. 510, 135
S. E. 350 (1926) ; Powell v. Assurance Society, 187 N. C. 596, 122 S. E. 303(1924) ; Patterson v. Champion Lumber Co., 175 N. C. 90, 94 S. E. 692 (1918) ;
Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416, 81 S. E. 624 (1914); Higson v.
North River Ins. Co., 153 N. C. 35, 68 S. E. 920 (1910), same case in federal
court, 184 Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1911); Bryson v. Southern R. R. Co., 141
N. C. 594, 54 S. E. 434 (1906) ; Lewis v. Clyde Steamship Co., 131 N. C. 652, 42
S. E. 969 (1902); Mecke v. Vallytown Mineral Co., 122 N. C. 790. 29 S. E. 781
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in the federal court do not extend this period and if the defendant neg-
lects to file his answer the state court may enter judgment for the
plaintiff by default, or the plaintiff may easily win the case in the
absence of the opposition of the defendant in the state court.30 If the
defendant has filed an answer in apt time in the federal court before
remand the state court is under no obligation to consider it.31 Indeed,
since theoretically the federal court never had jurisdiction it never had
the power to accept the answer. If the remand order has been entered
by the Federal District Court it cannot be reviewed and if by that time
the state court has rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff this
judgment would be res judicata. Nor, since the defendant's mistake as
to the proper jurisdiction was one of law and not of fact, will the
(1898) ; Howard v. Southern R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 944, 29 S. E. 778 (1898) ; Wil-
liams v. Southern Bell Telephone Co., 116 N. C. 558, 21 S. E. 298 (1895). But
cf. Hyder v. Southern R. R. Co., 167 N. C. 584, 83 S. F. 689 (1914) ; MCINTosH,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) 287; MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(1938) 3521-3528
"In the following cases the defendant, believing the suit had been removed,
failed to answer in the state court and so lost by default. Metropolitan Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85 L. ed. 1044 (1941) ; Yankaus v.
Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127, 37 S. Ct. 567, 61 L. ed. 1036 (1917) ; Higson v. North
River Ins. Co. 153 N. C. 35, 68 S. E. 920 (1910), same case in federal court, 184
Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1911); Western Indemnity Co. v. Kendall, 27 Ariz.
342, 233 Pac. 583 (1925) ; Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. (2d) 1053, 124
A. L. R. 149 (1939) ; State v. American Surety Co., 26 Idaho 652, 145 Pac. 1097,
Ann. Cas. 1916E, 209 (1914); Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83,
113 Pac. 89 (1910); Roberts v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 521, 51
X. W. 478 (1892), aflrnted, 164 U. S. 703, 17 S. Ct. 992, 41 L. ed. 1183 (1896) ;
McCanna v. Mutual Investment & Agency Co., 37 N. M. 567, 26 P. (2d) 231
(1933) ;.Citizens' Light, Power & Telephone Co. v. Usnik, 26 N. M. 494, 194 Pac.
862 (1921) ; Tierney v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., 126 App. Div. 446, 110 N. Y.
Supp. 613 (1908). He may, through lapse of time, lose his right to appeal in the
state courts. Finney v. American Bonding Co., 13 Idaho 534. 90 Pac. 859, 91 Pac.
318 (1907) ; Mills v. American Bonding Co., 13 Idaho 556, 91 Pac. 381 (1907). In
Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Indian-Tex Petroleum Co., 203 Ky. 521. 263 S. W. I
(1924) the plaintiff lost on a counterclaim through failure to file a reply in state
court after he had attempted removal. In Pearson v. Zacher, 177 Minn. 182, 225
X. W. 9 (1929) judgment was entered against the defendant after refusal to testify
against and failure to contest garnishment proceedings in state court after at-
tempted removal. In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Albright, 161 Okla. 272, 18 P.
(2d) 540 (1933) there was a loss through neglect of contest in state court by
non-resident defendants under belief that the suit had been removed as to them.
Where an insurance policy contained a clause making it incontestable after two
years the defendant, under the belief that the policy was being contested in federal
court after removal, lost the suit through failure to contest in the state court before
the end of two years. Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah
33. 7 P. (2d) 279 (1932). But cf. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Davis. 93 Tex. 378, 55
S. W. 562 (1900) (judgment entered in state court in interim before remand from
federal court held invalid even though defendant answered and defended the
case): Bishop-Babcock Sales Co. v. Lackman, 4 S. W. (2d) 109 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1928) (privilege of change of venue in state court not lost by delay, answering to
merits, and filing cross-action in federal court).
2' Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127. 37 S. Ct. 567. 61 L. ed. 1036 (1917):
Ayres v. Wiswall. 112 U. S. 187. 5 S. Ct. 90. 28 L. ed. 693 (1884) : Citizens' Light,
Power & Telephone Co. v. Usnik. 26 N. M. 494. 194 Pac. 862 (1921) : Tracy Loan
& Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 33, 7 P. (2d) 279 (1932).
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default be set aside because of defendant's mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect.32 Therefore the defendant would have lost
the suit without regard to the merits of his defense and would be with-
out redress in any court.
The defendant may sometimes guard against such a result by having
the federal court enjoin the plaintiff from proceeding in the state court
during the time the suit is in the federal court.8 3 Though ordinarily a
federal court may not enjoin proceedings in a state court, its power to
do so in removal cases has been recognized as an exception to the anti-
injunction statute even by recent cases narrowing such exceptions. 34
However, because of general federal policy against enjoining state court
proceedings the injunction will not issue in doubtful cases.3 5 And even
if the injunction were obtained it might not completely protect the de-
fendant. Such an injunction probably would not extend the time for
filing an answer in state court, and therefore there seems to be no reason
why the state court might not enter a default judgment immediately
after remand for failure of the defendant to answer during the period
which had expired while the case was pending in federal court.36 This
has even been done where the state court itself ordered the removal and
stayed its own proceedings.37
"Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. (2d) 1053, 124 A. L. R. 149
(1939); State v. American Surety Co., 26 Idaho 652, 145 Pac. 1097, ANN. CAs.
1916E, 209 (1914) ; Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83, 113 Pac. 89
(1910). The Idaho cases are the only ones which have been discovered which
explicitly discuss this particular point, but it is felt that other courts, with the pos-
sible exception of Texas, would follow this example. Cf. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S. W. 562 (1900); Bishop-Babcock Sales Co. v. Lackman,
4 S. W. (2d) 109 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928).
33HUGHES, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE (1931) §§1099, 1100, 1102, 1255, 2562; MooR-,
FED.ERAL PRAcrTIc (1938) 3327, 3529, n. 40.
' "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States
to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction
may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." 28 U. S.
C. A. §379; Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 62 S. Ct. 139, 86 L.
ed. (Adv. Ops.) 107 (1941); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207
29 S. Ct. 430, 53 L. ed. 765 (1908); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard
Mining Co.. 196 U. S. 239, 25 S. Ct. 251, 49 L. ed. 462 (1905) ; Dietzsch v. Huide-
koper. 103 U. S. 494, 26 L. ed. 497 (1881) ; see Note (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1084, 1104
and cases cited.
iHGHES, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE (1931) §2562.
Yankaus v. Feltenstein, 244 U. S. 127, 37 S. Ct. 567, 61 L. ed. 1036 (1917)
(injunction against enforcement of state court judgment rendered prior to the
injunction but subsequent to attempted removal); Pearson v. Zacher. 177 Minn..
182, 225 N. W. 9 (1929) (state court proceedings restrained after an order forjudgment was filed but before judgment was entered). In these cases the state
court continued with its proceedings after remand just as if there had been no
injunction. Though no case has been found precisely on the point, involving a
federal injunction, it is felt, in view of the statements in the state cases, cited in
note 37 infra. that the statement in the text is correct.37Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464. 92 P. (2d) 1053. 124 A. L. R. 149
(1939) : "The order of the [state] district judge staying further proceedings in
the state court had no reference to the appearance of the defendants, nor could it
extend their time for answering. This order stayed proceedings in the [state]
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THIRD .- It would seem that in order to be safe and at the same time
secure a prompt federal trial the defendant must follow his only other
alternative course-he must proceed with equal alertness and vigor in
both courts at the same time. He may continue to contest the action
in the state court and at the same time contest the same case in the
federal court to which he may have taken it despite the state court's
ruling in denial of removal.3 8 Both cases would be reviewable as to
removability in the appellate courts and might be carried to the United
States Supreme Court in proper cases. 39 All proceedings in the court
finally determined not to have proper jurisdiction would be void, and
an order to remand to the state court would negate any advantage the
defendant may have gained by the federal court proceedings. But the
defendant would not be prejudiced thereby because he would have been
contesting the suit all the time in the state court just as if there had
never been any attempt at removal. The most objectionable feature of
this strategy is the great additional expense required to litigate the same
suit in two different courts at the same time.
It has been said that the defendant suffers through his own fault
where he loses his case or incurs expense by being torn between the
conflicting court systems; that if he seeks to remove a case not properly
within the federal jurisdiction he should bear the consequences of his
act.40 But it should be remembered that the law of removals is ex-
district court only during the time the case might remain in the federal court,
and had special reference to the removal and rested solely on the petition for re-
moval." Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83, 91, 113 Pac. 89, 90 (1910) ;
McCanna v. Mutual Investment & Agency Co., 37 N. M. 597, 26 P. (2d) 231
(1933) ; Citizens' Light, Power & Telephone Co., v. Usnik, 26 N. M. 494, 194 Pac.
862 (1920) ; Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 33, 7 P.
(2d) 279 (1932).
"Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U. S. 563, 61 S. Ct. 715, 85
L. ed. 1044 (1941) ; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279, 6 S. Ct. 1050, 30 L. ed. 167
(1886); Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 26 L ed. 643 (1881) ;
Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, 26 L. ed. 354 (1880); Removal Cases, 101
U. S. 457, 25 L. ed. 593 (1879) ; see Pruitt v. Charlotte Power Co., 165 N. C. 416,
420, 81 S. E. 624, 626 (1914) ; Springs v. Southern R. R. Co., 130 N. C. 186, 198,
41 S. E. 100, 104 (1902); Howard v. Southern R. R. Co., 122 N. C. 944, 953, 29
S. E. 778, 781 (1898).-
" See notes 9, 11, 21, & 38 supra.
"0 "It seems to us proper and entirely just to both litigants to hold that when a
defendant petitions for the removal of a cause from a state to a federal court, he
becomes the actor in that particular, and that he must assume the risk and con-
sequences that follow, if he is unsuccessful, and. in the meantime has failed to
protect and preserve his right under the state statute and rules of practice prevail-
ing in the state court. . . . The statute fixes the time within which a defendant
shall appear and answer. That applies alike to all defendants. These appellants
have had the same time as is allowed every other defendant in the state courts.
The fact that appellants exhausted a part of their time in a vain endeavor to get
out of the state court into the federal court is neither the fault of the law, the
courts, nor the adverse party. If they saw fit to exhaust a part of their 'day in
c6urt' in an effort to get into another forum and failed, the consequence should
justly and properly fall upon them, and upon no one else. It should not serve as a
means of extending the time allowed them by statute or of delaying the adverse
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tremely complex and technical. The cases seem to be in chaotic conflict
on many points. 41 To add to the confusion a Circuit Court of Appeals
has recently upheld a District Court's revocation of a remand order it
had entered at the same term four days previously. 42 It is an open
question whether any state proceedings which could have been taken
during the intervening four-day period would have been valid or corain
non judice.43 Where such uncertainty exists, and the defendant can
hardly foresee how he may be bandied about between the court systems,
it seems harsh to beset him with so many dangers when he seeks to
secure his right to a federal trial.
The hardship is especially apparent where the state court has granted
the removal and thus led the defendant to believe he was safely within
the federal jurisdiction. In not filing his answer the defendant has relied
on the action of the state court, and it seems unjust indeed for that court
to enter a default judgment in such cases.44 An avoidance of such a
vicious policy would certainly lead to more equitable results.
Much trouble would be circumvented by rendering the injunction
safeguard more effective. The injunction should operate to toll any
lapse of time in the state court as well as to stay affirmative proceedings
there. 45 At present the federal court will not enjoin proceedings in the
state court after removal in cases where the jurisdictional question is
in doubt, 4 -but it is in those very cases that the injunction is most
needed. In the doubtful cases there is more likelihood that the state
court will insist that it has jurisdiction and proceed to judgment, and
also greater probability that the federal court will subsequently remand
the cause.4 7 Many hard cases would be avoided by a statutory provision
party in getting his case to trial after the question of jurisdiction has been
determined." Morbeck v. Bradford-Kennedy Co., 19 Idaho 83, 93, 94, 113 Pac. 89,
91, 92 (1910). This passage has been often quoted.
,1 Compare Boston, Removal of Suits from State to United States Courts-A
Picture of Chaos Demanding a Remedy (1919) 88 CENT. L. J. 246, with Urquhart,
Is the Law in Reference to the Removal of a Civil Case from a State Court to
the United States Court in a Chaotic Condition? (1919) 89 CENT. L. J. 280; Dobie,
Frictional Points of Conflict Between State and Federal Courts (1923) 19 VA. L.
REv. 485, 492.2 Bucy v. Nevada Const. Co., 125 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942); Note
(1935) 2 U. oF Ca. L. REv. 648.
"
8 See Chisholm v. Propeller Towing Boat Co. of Savannah, 59 S. C. 549, 553,
38 S. E. 156, 157 (1901). "Some steps had been taken in the state court after the
filing of the order of remand and before the filing of the order vacating, and it is
hardly conceivable that, if judgment had been rendered in the interim, it would be
void for want of jurisdiction, since jurisdiction was restored by the order of
remand. It being the duty of the state court to accept the order of remand as
final, and proceed with the cause, its jurisdiction could in no wise be affected by
the vacating order, which was made after the federal court had lost possession and
control of the cause!'
" Gernania Fire Ins. Co. v. Francis, 52 Miss. 457, 24 Am. Rep. 674 (1876);
see note 37 supra.
" See notes 36 and 37 supra. "See note 35 supra.
" HUH(;-ES, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1931) §§2286, 2655.
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that the injunction should issue automatically as a matter of course
wherever there is an attempted removal.
The policy of allowing both state and federal courts to pass on the
removal question is responsible for much of the conflict. A failure of
the two courts to agree may result in the absurdly inefficient spectacle
of the same suit, between the same parties, being litigated in two differ-
ent courts at the same time. 48 If only one court-the federal court-had
power to 'determine the propriety of removal much friction would be
eliminated. In such case the state court, knowing that it has no right
to determine the jurisdictional question, would probably adopt a much
less aggressive policy toward defendants who are seeking removal. In-
deed, even under the present arrangement, much distress would never
arise if the state courts would assume a more lenient and cooperative
attitude toward the problem. The Texas court has taken the lead in
even refusing to validate after remand a judgment entered in the interim
after filing of the removal petition and before the remand order, even
though the defendant answered and defended the case in state court. 40
But since many courts refuse to be so solicitous of the defendant's rights
it would be well to require the removal petition to be submitted only to
the federal court, as is now done in the case of removal for local
prejudice, and deny the state court any voice at all in the removal.
Though many problems could be ironed out by these half-way meas-
ures it is felt that many of the difficulties are inherent in the judicial
organization itself. Under our unnecessary duplication of judicial
machinery, where two courts may both take original cognizance of a
suit (and each is fearful of infringing on the other's jurisdiction, and
yet withal jealous of its own) many complications are bound to arise.50
The vast body of federal jurisdictional jurisprudence bears voluminous
testimony to this effect. Perhaps all discordant conflict will never be
eliminated by anything short of the abolition of any distinction between
the state and federal courts and the establishment of a uniform court
system.
JoHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
States-Immunity from Suit in Courts of Sister State
Plaintiff, a Georgia corporation, procured the issuance of a statutory
attachment in Georgia against the Florida Hospital for the Insane and
the officers of the State, by name. The attachment was levied on several
lots of land used in connection with the hospital, the hospital being in
4R See note 38 supra
,
9Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S. W. 562 (1900). Of course
in some cases this may work a hardship on the plaintiff.
" Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499.
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Florida and the land iii question in Georgia. Defendants filed a motion
to quash and dismiss the levy, contending that by virtue of the fact that
the officers of the state were joined in their official capacity, it was in
fact a suit against the state and that Florida had not consented to be
sued. Held, a state cannot claim immunity from suit as to land held in
another state.1
The Federal Constitution prohibits the maintenance of an action
against a state by a private person.2 This only prevents suits in Federal
Courts,3 but it is well established that a state cannot be sued in its own
courts or the courts of a sister state without its express consent.4  The
origin of this rule is not definitely known5 but the early technical basis
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was that since all writs were
issued by the king, he could not be sued by writ because he could not
command himself. 6
Whatever the historical basis for the rule might be, it is an estab-
lished principle of the American political system, and in absence of a
statute expressly giving the power to sue a state, a claim against a state
does not present a justiciable question.7 It is based upon the principle
of international comity, used in international law, which causes each
sovereign state to decline to exercise its territorial jurisdiction over the
person of any sovereign or ambassador or over the public property of
any state which is destined for public use.
8
Due to the vast number of government agencies, it is the policy of
all states9 as well as the Federal Government 0 to give some of their
1 Florida State Hospital for Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 17 S. E. (2d) 842
(Ga. App. 1941).U. S. CONST. AMEND. XI.
' Florida State Hospital for Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 192 Ga. 459, 15 S. E.
(2d) 509 (1941).
'Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. ed. 842 (1890) ; Beers v.
Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 15 L. ed. 991 (1858).
' See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 27 S. Ct. 526, 51 L. ed. 834
(1907).
l See McClellan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605, 170 Pac. 662 (1917) (see argument
made by counsel for plaintiff, 170 Pac. at 663); Note (1922) 35 HARV. L. REV.
335.7 Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo, 403, 19 P. (2d) 951
(1933).( Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 54 S. Ct. 745, 78 L. ed. 1282 (1933);
Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876 (1908) ; Nathan
v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 n. (Pa. 1781) (see note 1 L. ed. 44) ; The Ice King, German
Reichsgericht (1921) 103 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 274
(HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATiONAL LAW (1929) 536).
' North Carolina Governmental Employees Retirement System, N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3212(8) ; North Carolina State Thrift Society, N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1126; State Highway Commission, N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §3846(J); Commissioner of Banks, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §221(q).
10 Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 47 STAT. 6 (1932); 48 STAT. 1109
(1934), 15 F. C. A. 604 (1937); Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 48 STAT. 59(1933), 5 F. C. A. 831 (C) (1937); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 4
F. C. A. 264(J) (1937).
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agencies *the right to sue and be sued in their own names. But a judg-
ment obtained, against such an agency must be satisfied out of the assets
of the agency; the state is not bound if those assets are not sufficient
to meet the debt.":
The preceding statements apply to incorporated and unincorporated
agencies. There is, however, some authority to the effect that this right
is acquired only through the permission of the state, and that when one
state directly and without the intervention of a separate corporation
operates what is generally regarded as a private business, in another
state, it does not surrender its sovereignty.' 2
To constitute a suit against a state it is not necessary that the state
be sued directly, but any action in which the property of the state will
be affected is a suit against the state.13 This is especially true if the
land held by the state or its agency is held for a public purpose, 14 as
was the land in the instant case.
The court in reaching its decision relied mainly on Georgia v. City
of Chattanooga,"S which is a comparatively recent United States Su-
preme Court decision holding that the property of a railroad operated
by Georgia in Tennessee was subject to eminent domain. This case is
distinguishable from the instant case on two grounds. First, eminent
domain is a burden to which all property is subject regardless of the
character of its ownership.16 Therefore the subjection of state property
to eminent domain would not be tantamount to an attachment against
that property by an individual for a contract debt. Second, the court in
Georgia v. City of Chattanooga concluded that operating a railroad was
a non-governmental function, whereas state hospitals for the insane
are generally held to be created to perform governmental functions.'7
Even the most liberal advocates for a relaxation of the sovereign im-
munity rule concede that the relaxation ought to go only to the extent
of permitting suit when the state engages in a non-governmental func-
tion.'6 Therefore, the grounds for allowing suit against a state agency
engaged in a non-governmental function would not logically apply when
the agency being sued is engaged in a governmental function, as is the
hospital in the instant case.
" State v. Loche, 29 N. M. 148, 219 Pac. 790 (1923).2 Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N. D. 643, 227 N. W. 52 (1929) (South Dakota
operated a coal mine in North Dakota) ; Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 989.
"3 Danforth v. United States, 102 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
"4 El Camino Irr. Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp., 12 Cal. (2d) 378, 85 P. (2d)
123 (1938).1264 U. S. 472, 44 S. Ct. 369, 68 L. ed. 796 (1924).
16 See Paulus v. South Dakota, 58 N. D. 643, 227 N. W. 52 (1929).
17University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 287 S. W. 945 (1926)
McKay v. Washoe General Hospital, 55 Nev. 336, 33 P. (2d) 755 (1934) ; Mala's
Adm'r v. Eastern State Hospital, 97 Va. 509, 34 S. E. 617 (1899).
"8 See Hayes, Private Claims Against Foreign Sovereigns, (1925) 38 HARV.
L. REv. 599.
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In denying the defendant's petition for rehearing, the court made a
point of the fact that the issue of sovereignty was raised by the State
of Florida and not by the plaintiff. It is difficult to perceive how that
fact could have any bearing on the point at issue, because if the suit is
in fact a suit against a state it is immaterial who raised the issue, the
burden always being upon the one suing a state to show affirmatively
that the state has consented to be sued.19
On the basis of the conclusions reached it might appear that the
plaintiff, if not allowed to prosecute the suit, would have been left
without a remedy. This does not necessarily follow, because, as sug-
gested by counsel for the defendant, the plaintiff could have appealed
to the legislature of Florida.20 The argument might be made that such
remedy is of doubtful value; however, it must be kept in mind that one
who deals with an agency of a state is charged with knowledge of its
immunity from suit, and to this extent deals at his own risk.21
It is submitted that the case was not properly decided in that it per-
mitted suit against a state agency created to perform a governmental
function. The decision is not in harmony with the majority view as
the law stands today. However, it might well represent a trend on the
part of the judiciary toward making more flexible the rule which allows
states immunity from suit.
JOHN W. LANGFORD.
Tenancy by the Entirety-Effect of Willful Default in Payment of
Loan Secured by Deeds of Trust and Attempted Purchase by
One Tenant at Foreclosure Sale-Constructive Trusts
H. and W., during coverture, purchased certain real property and
received title thereto as tenants by the entirety. Thereafter, while the
marital relation continued to exist, they executed deeds in trust thereon
to secure money borrowed. Default in payment having occurred, the
property was sold under power of sale contained in the deeds of trust.
A third party became purchaser, and later reconveyed to H. H. and W.
were divorced shortly thereafter, and W. brought this action against H.,
alleging (1) that H. received all the income from the property and
purposely defaulted in payment of the loan in order to oust W. from
her interest in the entirety estate by purchasing at the trustee's sale,
1 Grande v. Casson, 50 Ariz. 397, 72 P. (2d) 676 (1937).
'o See Florida State Hospital for Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 17 S. E. (2d)
842, 848 (Ga. App. 1941).
" See Dunn Const. Co. v. State Board of Adjustment, 243 Ala. 372, 175 So. 383
(1937).
' W. further offered to prove that she contributed more than half of the
original purchase price. In its decision, the court held that, having been a tenant
by the entirety and having conveyed her interest in trust by joining in the deed-
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and (2) that H., through the third party, was the actual purchaser at
the sale. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that if W. could
prove these allegations, H. would be regarded as holding the title in
trust for her, and that she must elect within a reasonable time to avail
herself of such trust.2
This being the first case of this nature concerning a tenancy by the
entirety to come before the court, the decision was based on the rule
applicable to cotenancies under like circumstances. The general rule
is that if one cotenant attempts to oust other cotenants of their interests
by purchasing an outstanding title, he will be decreed to hold the
property in trust for such of the other cotenants as elect within a rea-
sonable length of time to contribute their respective portions of the
purchase price.3 "This principle arises from the privity subsisting be-
tween parties having a common possession of the same land, and a
common interest in the safety of the possession of each; and it only
inculcates that good faith which seems appropriate to their relative
possession. ' '4
It has been said that the mere relation of cotenancy is not considered
in North Carolina to be of such a confidential nature as to forbid the
purchase by one cotenant of the common property at a public sale,
either under legal process or under a power in a trust deed.- Two cases
are cited in support of this contention.6 An examination of these cases
reveals, however, that the purchasing cotenants were allowed to acquire
the title free of any trust in favor of the other cotenants because of the
fact that the encumbrances under which the sales were made were
placed on the land by the common ancestors through which all the
cotenants claimed, rather than by any or all of the cotenants them-
selves.7 In neither case is it indicated that the exception to the general
rule is based on the fact that the sale was a public one under legal
process.8 Thus. the North Carolina view, expressed through two hold-
of trust, it was immaterial as to what part, if any, of the purchase price she had
paid. Hatcher v. Allen, 220 N. C. 407, 409, 17 S. E. (2d) 454, 455 (1941).
" Hatcher v. Allen, 220 N. C. 407, 17 S. E. (2d) 454 (1941).
" Salter v. Odom, 240 Ala. 462, 199 So. 687 (1940) ; Stewart v. Sherman. 22
Calif. App. (2d) 198. 70 P. (2d) 702 (1937) ; Kievman v. Grevers, 122 Conn. 406.
189 Atl. 609 (1937) ; Hayden v. Hughes, 147 Kan. 511, 77 P. (2d) 64 (1940) :
Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 478, 102 P. (2d) 64 (1940) ; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(3d. ed. 1939) §463; FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION (1882) §154.
"Marshall, J., in Venable v. Beauchamp, 33 Ky. 321, 324 (1836).5 Note (1919) 6 A. L. R. 297.
STroxler v. Gant, 173 N. C. 422, 92 S. E. 152 (1917) ; Jackson v. Baird, 148
N. C. 29, 61 S. E. 632 (1908).
"The practice of making an exception to the rule when the sale is under an
encumbrance placed on the land by the common predecessor in title is criticized in
Note (1908) 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 591.
'A District of Columbia case, Starkweather v. Jenner, 216 U. S. 524, 30 S. Ct.
382. 54 L. ed. 602 (1910). does expressly excdpt purchase at a public sale from the
operation of the rule, all fraud aside.
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ings and several dicta,10 is in accord with the general rule denying a
tenant in common the right of purchasing any outstanding interest to
the detriment of his cotenants, provided the latter elect within a reason-
able length of time to take advantage of the trust by paying him a pro-
portionate share of his expenditures.
It is fitting that the court, for purposes of deciding the principal
case, should draw an analogy between the natures of tenancies by the
entirety and tenancies in common. Tenants. by the entirety are even
more likely to occupy positions of mutual trust and confidence than are
tenants in common. They derive their title through the same instru-
ment, and, being husband and wife, they take the entirety estate as one
person." It is well that neither should be allowed to acquire an out-
standing title to the detriment of the other.
Another possible reason for the application of rules governing ten-
ancies in common to the instant case, not mentioned by the court, is the
fact that, at the time of the trial, the parties actually were tenants in
common, the divorce which occurred between the time of the sale and the
time of the trial having converted them into such.' 2
Only one case' 3 has been found wherein a tenant by the entirety
purchased the interest of the other tenant at a public sale. In that case,
a New Jersey court upheld the right of a wife to purchase, as trustee
for her children, the interest of her husband in entirety property; and
the court further said, by way of dictum, that she would have had the
same right as anyone else to acquire the title free of any trust, even
though she purchased, not as trustee, but for her exclusive benefit.
This seems directly opposed to the result reached in the principal case.
The court may have been influenced by the fact that only the interest
of the husband was being sold, it being permissible for the interest of
one tenant by the entirety to be sold under execution in New Jersey. 14
This latter principle tends to destroy the idea of unity and confidential
relation. The sale of the interest of one spouse would not be allowed
in North Carolina.15
Thus, a commendable result has been achieved in the principal case.
When property is held by the entireties, the husband is entitled to the
' Sutton v. Sutton, 211 N. C. 472, 190 S. E. 718 (1937) ; Gentry v. Gentry, 187
N. C. 29, 121 S. E. 188 (1924).
"o See McLawhorn v. Harris, 156 N. C. 107, 111, 72 S. E. 211, 213 (1911);
Jackson v. Baird, 148 N. C. 29, 30, 61 S. E. 632 (1908), cited supra note 6; Bailey
v. Howell, 209 N. C. 712, 715, 184 S. E. 476, 478 (1936) ; Smith v. Smith, 150
N. C. 81, 82, 63 S. E. 177 (1908).
" TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd. ed. 1939) §430; FREEMAN, COTENANCY ANT
PARTITION (1882) §70.
McKinnon, Currie & Co. v. Caulk, 167 N. C. 411, 83 S. E. 559 (1914).
Zubler v. Porter, 98 N. J. L. 444, 120 AtI. 194 (1923).
,Ibid.
" Bank of Glade Spring v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E. 222 (1912).
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usufruct thereof.16 It would be manifestly unjust to permit him to fail
to use the income from the property to discharge encumbrances thereon,
in order that he might later purchase the property for his sole benefit.
By means of the remedial device of a constructive trust, the court has
prevented such a misfortune.
JOEL DENTON.
16 Lewis v. Pate, 212 N. C. 253, 193 S. E. 20 (1937).
